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Survey of Recent Developments in Indiana Criminal Law 
and Procedure 
BRUCE G. BERNER* 
DAVID E. VANDERCOY** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
() 
This Article surveys important developments in Indiana criminal law 
and procedure over the past year .1 Section I highlights changes in the-
substantive law of crimes. As usual, this area is relatively static, and 
therefore the section is brief. Section II highlights changes in criminal 
procedure. As usual, this area is dynamic and the section is therefore 
much longer. Although this is a survey of Indiana law, many of the 
developments discussed are from th~ United States Supreme Court cases. 
'This is necessarily so. No one can practice criminal law, in this state 
or in any other, without realizing that a great majority of procedures 
are driven by the United States Constitution, as that document is con-
tinually interpreted by the high court. 
The Indiana appellate courts, too, devoted a large portion of their 
energies to issues of criminal procedure. Those decisions are highlighted 
as well. 
II. SUBSTANTIVE 
A. The Mens Rea Requirement 
In State v. Keihn,2 the Indiana Supreme Court faced the question 
of what mens rea, defined as "culpability" under the M'odel Penal Code 
and the Indiana Code,3 must be proved when the pertinent statute is 
silent on the question. At issue was Indiana Code section 9-1-4-52(a), 
which provides as follows: 
A person may not operate a motor vehicle upon the public 
highways while his driving privilege, license, or pertnit is sus-
pended or revoked. A person who violates this subsection com-
mits a class A misdemeanor. 4 
• Professor of Law and Associate Dean, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
•• Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. 
1. January 1990 to December 1990. 
2. 542 N .E.2d 963 (lnd~ 1989). 
3. See IND. CODE § 35-41-2·2 (1988) and MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1962). 
4. IND. CoDE § 9-1-4-Sl(a) (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
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Does a person who drives without knowledge of suspension or revocation 
violate this provision.? In Keihn, the court answered this question in the 
negative.' 
Unless the legislature is constitutionally prohibited from defining a 
crime without an element of mens rea,6 which the defendant did not 
argue, the court's task is to discover legislative intent. Because nothing 
in the legislative histo'ry of this statute spoke explicitly on this point, 
the court was placed in the position of applying_ general rules of legislative 
construction. Previous Indiana cases, however, pointed in opposing di-
rections.' 
The court in Keihn cited with approval sections from the 1974lndiana 
Criminal Law Study Commission which were not formally adopted and, 
although it does not indicate such precisely, the court strongly suggests 
that future cases will be judged by the methodology of those provisions: 
for felonies: and misdemeanors that are silent on mens rea, the assumption 
is that ''wilfully" must be proved;8 for infractions silent on mens rea, 
the assumption is that no mens rea need be proved.9 The logic of this 
approach is evident. When a serious criminal penalty is involved, one 
cannot assume that the legislature would command punishment without 
proof of culpability jj Strict liability in crime runs contrary to history. 10 
If, on the other hand, the liability is for a noncriminal infraction, one 
cannot lightly assume that the legislature intended to put the state to 
the burdens usually associated with criminal prosecution. This approach, 
of course, applies only when legislative intent is unclear. The legislature 
is, within constitutional limits, free to specify whatever mens rea or lack 
thereof it wishes, provided it does so clearly and explicitly. 
B. The Defense of ~'Impossibility ·,, 
In State v. Haines, 11 the Indiana Second District Court of Appeals 
was confronted by a beguiling juxtaposition of the old (the "impossi-
S. Keihn, S42 N .. E.2d at 96S. 
6. There is considerable question whether a state could constitutionally remove 
proof of mens rea for traditionally serious crimes such as murder. See, e.g., Patterson 
v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977). 
7~ For example, under bm. CoDE § 9..4-l-40 (1988), leaving the scene of an 
accident has been interpreted to require proof of knowledge of the accident. See Micinski 
v. State, 487 N.E.2d ISO (1986). On the other hand, under IND. CoDE § 9-ll-2~2 to -5 
(1988), driving while intoxicated and causing death does not require proof of knowledge 
of intoxication. See Smith v. State, 496- N.E.2d 778 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). 
8.. "Wilfully, means intentionally, knowingly, -or recklessly. See IND. CODE § '35-
41.;2~2 (1988). ' 
9, Keihn, 542 N.E.2d at 967. 
10. ./d. at 966. 
11. S4S N.E.2d '834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
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bility" defense to attempt) and the new (the AIDS virus). Police, re-
sponding to a call reporting a possible suicide attempt, discovered the 
defendant unconscious in a pool of blood. Upon regaining consciousness, 
the defendant informed the officers he had AIDS; threatened to "give 
it to them;'' shook his body for the express purpose of splashing his 
blood on the officers' faces and eyes; bit the officers and splashed his 
blood on the open wounds; and hit one officer in the face with a wig 
dripping with defendant's blood. On this evidence, the defendant was 
convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder. The trial court 
subsequently granted the defendant's motion for judgment on the evidence 
and vacated the conviction. The State appealed. 
Judge Buchanan, writing for the court of appeals, reversed and 
remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury verdict. The appellate 
court examined the case for, inter alia, the defense of "impossibility. " 12 
The traditional approach to attempt differentiated "factual impossibil-
ity,'' which is not a defense, from ''legal impossibility,'' which is a 
defense. 13 This distinction, which has puzzled generations of law students, 
is not an easy one to draw .14 The distinction essentially is between trivial 
or temporary factual mistakes15 and profound or permanently incurable 
mistakes. 16 This distinction became unimportant in states, such as Indiana, 
that adopted the Model Penal Code provisions on inchoate crimes. 17 
Under those provisions, neither type of impossibility is a defense. 18 Judge 
12. /d. at 838. 
13. W. LAFAVE & A. Scon, ClliMINAL LAw § 6.3 (2d ed. 1986). 
14. There is no use trying to think of "factual impossibility" as entailing a factual 
mistake and "legal impossibility" as entailing a legal mistake. Defendants who think their 
actions are criminal when they are not (who might, in common parlance, be said to be 
making a legal mistake) simply have no criminal mens rea and thus need no "defense." 
IS. Mitchell v. State, 71 S.W. 17S (Mo. 1902) (defendant who shot toward a bed 
thinking the victim was there only to discover he was in another room). 
16. Such as in the paradigmatic case of trying to kill someone who is already 
dead. 
17. IND. CODE § 3!5-41-!5-1 (1988). 
18. This change was driven by the Model Penal Code drafters' radically different 
understanding of the fundamental purposes for inchoate crimes, including attempt. Whereas 
the common-law approach focused on preventing social harm (and, thus, was not troubled 
by defendants trying to kill dead people because no harm was possible), the Model Penal 
Code's inchoate crime provisions are aimed at identifying "manifestly dangerous persons." 
2 MoDEL PENAL CoDB PART I CoMMENTAlliBS I S.Ol (198S). Simply put, defendants who 
try to kill dead people are dangerous because they form a criminal mens rea and act on 
that intention. The Model Penal Code recognizes .. inherent impossibility" - that is, 
.choosing a method of committing a crime that is facially inappropriate to achieve the 
intended result (such as throwing darts at x's picture with the intent to kill x). /d. However, 
this "inherent impossibility" is not a defense even under the Model Penal Code, but 
simply a factor to mitigate the sentence. /d. In any event, "inherent impossibility., is 
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Buchanan's opm10n makes it clear that impossibility is not a defense 
to attempt in Indiana. 19 
In Haines, the defendant also argued, and the trial court apparently 
agreed, that the defendant had not taken a "substantial step" toward 
commission of the crime, which is the test for the required "act" 
element.20 However, as Judge Buchanan noted, this argument confuses 
the "act" requirement with the impossibility defense. 21 Not only did the 
defendant commit sufficient acts under the substantial-step test, he com-
mitted all the acts he intended. 22 In measuring acts, courts must adopt 
the defendant's perspective on reality, in this case, that biting and blood-
splashing can infect the victim with a deadly disease. 23 To adopt some 
other reality (for example, that biting cannot transfer the AIDS virus) 
is to consider the "impossibility" question under the guise of an "act." 
III. CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
A. Arrest, Search, and Seizure 
1. The Beneficiaries of the Fourth Amendment.-In United States 
v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 24 federal officials searched, with the permission of 
Mexican authorities, the defendant's home in Mexico. The defendant 
was a foreign national and his only entry into the United States had 
occurred three days earlier when he was involuntarily forced into the 
United States under federal arrest. Clearly the warrantless search of his 
house would not pass muster under the fourth amendment;2' however, 
the United States Supreme Court held 6-3 that the defendant was not 
included within the meaning of "the people" in the fourth amendment.26 
Had the defendant been a resident alien or even an illegal alien, the 
result might be different. However, the defendant had insufficient con-
nection with the United States to claim the benefit of fourth amendment 
protection. 27 The dissent asserted that compliance with the fourth amend-
foreclosed in this case because expert testimony showed that one could, by actions similar 
to those of the defendant, infect a victim with the AIDS virus, and that such virus could 
produce the death of the victim. Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 841. 
19. Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 838-39. 
20. /d. at 836. 
21. /d. at 838. 
22. /d. at 841. 
23. /d. 
24. 110 S. Ct. 1056 (1990). 
25. See, e.g., Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980). 
26. Verdugo-Urquidez, 110 S. Ct. at 1064. 
27. /d. 
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ment was an unavoidable correlative of the power to prosecute foreign 
nationals under United States penal laws.28 
2. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy. The Supreme Court has 
long recognized that homeowners, tenants, and paying hotel guests have 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in those spaces.29 The·Supreme Court 
in Minnesota v. O/son30 extended the expectation of privacy to overnight, 
·nonpaying guests in private homes.31 The Court was careful to explain 
that its holding does not indicate that everyone lawfully on premises 
has this expectation.32 In Olson, the defendant, an overnight guest of 
the homeowner, had. interests sufficiently similar to paying guests in 
hotels, motels, and boardinghouses to receive fourth amendment pro-
tection. 33 However, nothing in the opinion suggests that daytime guests 
in a private home would, without more, gain this protection. 
3. Search Incident to Arrest. The most common type of a war-
rantless_ s_earch is the search incident to lawful arrest.34 The United States 
Supreme Court decided three cases in this area. 
In Smith v. Ohio,35 two policemen approached the defendant and 
his companion because the police were curious_ about the brown paper 
bag that the defendant was carrying which was marked "Kash n' Karry" 
and "Loaded with Low Prices." Clearly no probable cause existed f~r 
an arrest, and the State of Ohio made no Terryl'-type stop-and-frisk 
argument. The State conceded that the officers were acting on a mere 
hunch.37 When the defendant was stopped, the defendant threw the bag 
on the hood of his car and turned to face the police. The police opened 
the bag and discovered illegal paraphernalia. The State argued that this 
discovery justified the initial stop.38 The Supreme Court held 9·0 that 
the fruits of a search cannot supply the probable cause for the arrest 
to which the search is then incident.39 Although the Court did not use 
terms such as "bootstrap" or '-'circularity," such terms fairly characterize 
the argument the State of Ohio relied upon. 
28. /d. at 1077 (Brennen, J ~. dissenting). 
29. ''Reasonable expectation of privacy•' is the current test for determining whether 
police conduct is a ''search.'' See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). 
30. 110 S. Ct. 1684 (1990). 
31. !d. at 1689-90. 
32. I d. at 1687. 
33. ld. at 1690. 
34. Berner, Search and Seizure: Status and Methodology, 8 VAL. U.L. REv. 471, 
534 (1974). 
35. 110 S. Ct. 1288 (1990). 
36. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
37. Smith, 110 S. Ct. at 1289. 
38. /d. at 1290. 
39. /d. 
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Maryland v~ Buie"J is a significant case concerning the power of 
police to '"'sweep" a house incident to arrest. In Buie, two men had 
just robbed a Godfather's Pizza, and one, was arrested in his home after 
fresh pursuit. After securing him, the police walked into the basement 
to look for the other perpetrator and found, instead, evidence of de-
fendant's involvement in the crime, a red running suit. The United States 
Supreme Court held that, incident to an arrest in a house,. the police 
may conduct a "protective sweep" of an area if they possess a "rea-
sonable belief based on specific, articulable facts that the area to be 
swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest 
scene. " 41 The Court rejected the ,government's request for an "automatic" 
right to make such a sweep incident to all arrests in homes,42 but indicated 
in dicta that an automatic right exists to search "closets and other spaces 
immediately adjacent to the place of arrest from which an attack could 
be immediately launched .. ' ,.43 This innocent sounding sentence likely will 
spawn much litigation. Outside this immediate area, however, the Terry 
''reasonable suspicion'' standard is required." So long as the police 
conduct a proper cursory check of only those places where persons might 
be biding, anything that the police observe falls within the ''plain view'' 
doctrine and is admissible. 4' 
New York v. Harris46 raised a subtle question under the "fruit-of-
the-poisonous·tree'' doctrine.47 Police arrested Harris in his home for 
murder. The police had probable cause but no warrant to enter his 
home; thus, the arrest violated the fourth amendment under the authority 
of Payton v. New York,48 which requires a warrant to enter a private 
home to make an arrest, even though such arrest could be made without 
a warrant in any other place:49 After being taken to the station, Harris 
made a Mirandized confession. The Supreme Court held 5-4 that the 
statement was not tainted by the Payton violation.50 Unlike an arrest 
made without probable cause, the Court reasoned that the custody 
40. 110 S. Ct. 1093 (1990). 
41. /d. at 1099-1100. 
42. Id. 
• 
43. /d. at 1098. 
44. ld. 
4S. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U ~S. 234 (1968). 
46. 110 S. Ct. 1640 (1990). 
. . 
47. This doctrine, which has ·a variety of applications, provides that any product 
(such as statements or hard evidence) of prior illegal police behavior is tainted with such 
illegality and, thus, excluded. See, .e.g .. , Silverthorne Lumber Co., v. United States, 2S l 
u.s. 385 (1920). 
48. 44S U :S. 573 (1980). 
49. Id. at 600. . 
SO. Harris, 110 S .. Ct. at 1644. 
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resulting from such arrest is not itself illegal after the arrestee is taken 
from his home." The interest invaded is not a liberty interest, but a 
privacy interest centered in the home. 52 Indeed, the trial court ruled that 
statements Harris made while still in the home were inadmissible.'l After 
the suspect is removed from the home, the taint is removed. 54 Of course, 
any statement taken after the defendant is removed from the home 
would have to comply with the fifth and sixth amendments.'' 
4. Third-party Consent. Fourth amendment privacy interests can 
be lost through consent to search, including consent given by a third 
party. 56 The test for determining whether the third party had the power 
to give consent is whether the person giving consent had sufficient 
dominion and control over the space.'' Illinois v. Rodriguez'8 raises the 
interesting problem of consent given by someone the police had every 
reason to believe was a co-occupant of the house but who had, in fact, 
recently moved from the residence. The Supreme Court held 6~3 that 
the consent was operative because police action which is reasonable, 
though mistaken, cannot be deterred and need not be remedied. 59 This 
case reinforces a critical fourth amendment lesson that the proper per-
spective from which to judge police conduct is the facts as they appear 
to a reasonable police officer. 60 When a police officer is reasonably 
mistaken, the officer's actions can only be sensibly judged by adopting 
the officer's perspective on reality. To judge such actions in light of 
facts not accessible to the officer is illogical. The converse is also true. 
A police officer who makes an unreasonable search of a house and is 
lucky to find contraband cannot defend the action based on the outcome 
of the search. 
5. Automobile Inventories. Florida v. Well~1 is a case whose dicta 
is far more important than its holding. The Supreme Court previously 
had approved inventory searches of impounded vehicles including a search 
of closed containers, provided those searches were "routine" or "stan-
5L /d. at 1644-45. 
52. /d. at 1643. 
53. /d. at 1642. 
S4. /d. at 1643 (had Harris been arrested on the street. no violation would have 
occurred). 
55. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (fifth amendment); 
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U,S. 387 (1977) (sixth amendment). 
56. See, e.g., United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974). 
51. !d. at 169-72. 
58. 110 S. Ct. 2793 (1990). 
59. /d. at 2800. 
60. !d. at 2801. 
61. 110 S. Ct. 1632 (1990). 
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dardized. " 62 In Wells, the police opened a locked suitcase found in the 
trunk. The police department had no regulations guiding the officer's 
discretion in such matters. The Court held that an inventory without 
any guidelines gave too much discretion to police. 63 Guidelines clearly 
authorizing the opening of "all" containers, or "no" containers, or 
containers specifically described in the regulations would pass muster. 64 
The Court suggested that some discretion on which containers to open 
may be left to the individual officer, and concluded with this language 
that threatens an exception to swallow the rule: It would be "equally 
permissible to allow . . . the opening of closed containers whose contents 
officers determine they are unable to ascertain from examining the 
container's exteriors. " 6' 
6. Stop and Frisk.-In Alabama v. White,66 tqe police received an 
anonymous tip that the defendant would leave her apartment at a 
particular time, enter a particular car, and drive to a particular motel 
carrying cocaine in the car. Police staked out her apartment, followed 
her as she drove the predicted route, and stopped her as she approached 
the motel. The state conceded that this was a Terry stop requiring 
"reasonable suspicion. " 67 The Court held that the anonymous tip, though 
insufficient to produce probable cause under Illinois v. Gates,68 never-
theless produced reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop. 69 
In Molino v. State,'0 the Indiana Supreme Court had occasion to 
examine the initial phase of a police-suspect encounter in an airport 
setting with a "drug-courier profile," a recurrent situation that has 
deeply divided the United States Supreme Court.71 The defendant, an 
Hispanic male, carrying only a leather handbag, "quickly" deplaned in 
Indianapolis from a flight originating in Florida, did not claim luggage, 
visited the restroom, and walked quickly outside to hail a taxicab. At 
this point, three officers, who had been monitoring the defendant, 
approached him. One displayed his badge and identification card, iden-
tified himself as a narcotics investigator, and inquired if he could ask 
62. See Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987); South Dakota v. Opperman, 
428 u.s. 364 (1976). 
63. Wells, 110 S. Ct. at 1635 . 
64. /d. 
6S. ld. 
66. 110 S. Ct. 2412 (1990). 
67. During the stop, the defendant consented to a search of the car that produced 
cocaine. 
68. 462 u.s. 213 (1983). 
69. White, 110 S. Ct. at 2415 . 
70. 546 N.E.2d 1216 (Ind. 1989). 
71. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); United States v. Mendenhall, 
446 u.s. 544 (1980). 
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several questions, to which the defendant consented. The defendant 
showed his identification and airline ticket which were unremarkable, 
and stated that he was a clothing buyer. The officer then asked if he 
could look inside the handbag. The defendant indicated agreement. 
During this search, the defendant exhibited nervousness. When asked if 
the defendant would consent to a search of his person, he responded, 
"I have drugs. " 72 From this point on, the police followed all proper 
procedures. The defendant was convicted for possession of cocaine with 
intent to deliver. 
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, 3-2, in an 
opinion written by Justice Givan.73 The opinion leaves some doubt as 
to which of these two rationales is the decisive one: (a) the defendant 
had not been ''seized'' at the point he made the incriminating response; 
or (b) he had been "seized," but the seizure was proper under the stop .. 
and-frisk doctrine. The Indiana Supreme Court cited United States v. 
Mendenha//,14 a case remarkably similar on the facts, for the proposition 
that such questioning in an airport is not a seizure. 7' Only two justices, 
however, joined in that portion of the Mendenhall opinion, and later 
cases evidence a tendency of the United States Supreme Court to treat 
such confrontations as seizures. 76 
Molino is more tractable to a "no seizure" solution than cases like 
Florida v. Royer'' in which the defendant was escorted by airport police 
to an interrogation room. In Molino, the interrogation and searches 
took place on an airport sidewalk. Even so, it is difficult to imagine 
that someone who is approached as Molino was by the three narcotics 
officers would, in any objective sense, feel "free to go," which is the 
acknowledged test for lack of a seizure.78 Indeed, when the police asked 
for his "consent" to a personal search, Molino responded, "I have 
drugs. " 79 This does not sound like the response of someone who believes 
he is in a friendly conversation from which he can leave at will. 
Molino can be more fairly interpreted as resting on a finding that 
there existed reasonable suspicion for the stop. The Indiana Supreme 
Court stated: "The police officers were merely in a 'stop and frisk' 
situation at the time appellant volunteered the information that he was 
carrying drugs. ''80 The dissenting opinions of Justices DeBruler and 
72. Molino, S46 N.E.2d at 1217. 
73. ld. at 1219. 
74. 446 u.s. 544 (1980). 
75. Molino, 546 N.E.2d at 1220. 
76. See, e.g., United States v. Sokolow, 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). 
77. 460 u.s. 491 (1983). 
• 
78. See United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
79. Molino, 546 N.E.2d at 1217. 
80. /d. at 1219 . 
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Dickson argue that the sparse facts of this case, even if they might be 
. properly combined with other facts under a drug-courier profile, are 
simply not enough to produce reasonable suspicion.81 
If the court based its decision on a finding of reasonable suspicion, 
re.cent United States. Supreme Court decisions demonstrate the Court's 
willingness to find that reasonable suspicion is present on fewer facts 
than in the past. The facts in United States v. Sokolow"2 are somewhat 
stronger than in. Molino, and perhaps decisively s.o.83 The finding of 
reasonable suspicion in Sokolow was not, as the Molino court intimated, 
because of the drug-courier profile, but in spite of it. 84 The primary 
difficulty with the Molin.o opinion is that it does not attempt to make 
a case for reasonable suspicion based on the facts before it. The opinion 
addresses primarily the "no seizure" issue and then the events that occur 
after the incriminating response which were not an issue in the case. 
In Molino, the Indiana Supreme Court gave little justification for its 
stated holding. 
7. Warrants. Indiana Code section 35-33-5-8 provides that affi-
davits in support of search or arrest warrants now may be forwarded 
to the judge by facsimile transmission (FAX), and that the warrants 
may be returned by similar transmission.-85 This provision undoubtedly 
will save valuable time in situations in which time is of the essence-. 
One ponders whether this will lead courts in close cases to be more 
insistent on the use of warrants because warrants now will be obtainable 
with less delay .. 
8. Drunk-Driving Roadblocks. In a long-awaited decision, the 
United States Supreme Court in Michigan Department of State Police 
v. Sitz,86 upheld (6-3) police roadblocks to monitor drivers for driving 
under the influence.87 The Court .employed the administrative-search 
balancing process by weighing the government's ''special need'' against 
the privacy loss resulting from the particular .intrusion involved.88 Statistics 
and other evidence of the mayhem caused by drunk drivers were found 
to outweigh the relatively minimal intrusion involved in such stops. 89 
81. /d. at 1220 (DeBruler. J ., dissenting); id. at 1221 (Dickson, J ., dissenting). 
82. 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). 
83. In Sokolow, the defendant paid $2,100 for two round trip tickets from a roll 
of $20 bills; he traveled under a name that did not match his telephone number; his 
original destination was Miami. where he stayed for only 48 hours; he appeared nervous; 
and he checked none of his lu~age. 
84. Id. at 1587. 
85. bm. CoDE § 35-33-S-8 (Supp. 1990). 
86. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
87. /d. at 2488. 
88. Id. at 2485. 
89~ Id. at 2486. 
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The Court addressed only the issue regarding the initial check of all 
drivers, and left questions concerning how much evidence justifies longer, 
more intrusive procedures for other cases.90 Justice Stevens's dissent is 
intriguing. He would disallow random, unannounced roadblocks, but 
would permit regular, fixed, and anticipatable intrusions such as metal 
detectors at all subway entrances and breathalyzer checks at all toll-road 
entrances. 91 
9. The Plain-View Doctrine.-Horton v. Californian put to rest 
the mysterious "inadvertence" requirement of the plain-view doctrine93 
by holding 7-2 that the fourth amendment does not require "inadver-
tence" during plain-view searches.94 Thus, if the police have probable 
cause that a house contains a gun and illegal drugs, and obtain a warrant 
specifying only the gun, any drugs found during the search will be 
admissible under the plain-view doctrine provided that (1) the police 
were looking only in places where the gun could be found,· and that 
(2) the police had not yet found the gun.9' The Court points out that 
police have little incentive to omit items from warrant applications because 
each listed item will expand and never contract the scope of the search.96 
B. Police Interrogation 
The case of Pennsylvania v. Muniz91 serves as a useful review of 
many well-established Miranda exceptions with only one new develop-
ment. In Muniz, the defendant was arrested for drunk driving and was 
taken to the police station. He was asked a series of biographical questions 
(name, age, address, etc.) which he answered with slurred speech. The 
police videotaped a series of sobriety tests that the defendant failed 
miserably. The defendant was asked if he would take a breathalyzer 
test. He responded with a series of spontaneous admissions. When asked 
the calendar date of his sixth birthday, the defendant did not respond 
correctly. The defendant was not Mirandized. 
The Supreme Court stated that the biographical questions, though 
conceded to be "custodial interrogation," were exempt from Miranda 
90. /d. at 2485. 
91. /d. at 2497-98 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
92. 110 S. Ct. 2301 (1990). 
93. This requirement, which states that under the plain-view doctrine, police may 
not seize those things they anticipated finding, stems from Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 
403 u.s. 443 (1971). 
94. Horton, 110 S. Ct. at 2304. 
9S. Id. at 2309. 
96. /d. at 2304-10. 
97. 110 S. Ct. 2638 (1990). 
HeinOnline -- 24 Ind. L. Rev. 733 1990-1991 
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under the "routine booking_ question" exception.98 The defendant's be-
havior and slurred spe.ech were outside Miranda because they were not 
''testimonial'' or ''communicative,'' but were instead physical evidence 
of the defendant's body motion and speech similar to voice and hand-
writing exemplars which have been long understood to be outside the 
fifth amendment.99 The spontaneous statements falling within what many 
courts call the "blurting out;, doctrine were- admissible because they 
were not the product of "custodial interrogation!' 100 One of the more 
common misconceptions is that Miranda warnings are required in all 
arrests~ The rule is only that such warnings must be given if custodial 
interrogation is to follow .101 All of these holdings are quite consistent 
with past cases.l02 
In Muniz, the Court held, however, that the answer to the ''sixth 
birthday" question should have been suppressed .. 103 Even though the 
prosecution argued that it only wanted the answer to show slurred speech 
and impaired mental activity, the Court held that the ''content'' of the 
answer was implicated, 104 and thus the answer was excluded from the 
voice-handwriting exemplar exception.105 This holding leaves some ques-
tions unresolved. What would the Court hold if the question called for 
some mental acuity, for example, adding three-digit numbers in the head, 
but did not involve any of the suspect's biographical history? Would 
this example just be a different kind of field sobriety test? 
In Illinois v. Perkins,106 police placed an undercover agent, posing 
as an inmate, in the defendant's cell. The agent encouraged the defendant 
to talk about the crime, and the defendant gave a series of incriminating 
responses. 107 The Court held that Miranda did not apply because the 
coercion with which Miran-da is concerned was not involved.108 Until the 
defendant thinks he is being interrogated by a policeman, the ''inherent 
c_ompulsion" is absent. 109 However, had formal judicial proceedings al-
98. Id. at 2650. 
99. /d. ~t 2644-45. See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (suspect 
can be compelled to participate in a lineup). 
100. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
101. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 477-79 (1966). 
102. See, e.g., New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984); United States v. Dionisio, 
410 U.S. I (1973). 
103. Muniz, 110 S. Ct. at 2646. 
104. /d. 
105. See United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973) (voice exemplars): United 
States v. Mara, 410 U;S. 19 (1973) (handwriting exemplars). 
106. 110 S. Ct. 2394 (1990). 
107. Miranda warnings, of course, were not given as this tends seriously to undermine 
the ruse. 
108. Perkins, 110 S. Ct. at 2397•98. 
109. /d. 
• 
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ready begun, the sixth amendment would have prohibited this police 
conduct. 110 Once again, the Rehnquist Court takes a different view of 
the fifth amendment Miranda protection from its sixth amendment pro-
tection against custodial interrogation emanating from the assistance-of-
counsel clause. 
The Court previously has_ held that under both the fifth and sixth 
amendments,_ once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, interrogation 
must cease and may not begin again unles-s initiated by the suspect. 111 
In Michigan v. Harvey, 112 the- Court held S-4 that statements taken in 
violation of this rule may be used, without offending either amendment, 
to impeach the trial testimony of a defendant provided that the statement 
is given voluntarily.113· The dissent pointed out, however,- that under this 
case, after a suspect invokes counsel, there is little to deter police from 
continuing the interrogation because the defendant will rarely initiate 
further questions or cooperate after he has spoken with a lawyer.l14 The 
rationale for the majority's decision, as in cases of using nonMirandized 
statements to impeach,··~ is to discourage perjury. 116 
James v. Illinoisu' is an intriguing case which produced a surprisingly 
close S-4 vote with Justice Brennan voting with the majority. In James, 
the defendant was arrested for murder and attempted murder. The arrest, 
as conceded by the State, was illegal. 118 The defendant, whose hair was 
short and black upon arrest, made the incriminating statement under 
police interrogation that his hair had been long and reddish-brown at 
the time of the incident and that he had cut it and dyed it to alter his 
appearance. Because this confession was the product of an unlawful 
arrest, the trial court suppressed, it as fruit of the poisonous tree, a 
ruling that the State did not appeal. Under Harris v. New York, 119 the-
statement nevertheless would have been available to impeach the defen-
dant if he testified inconsistently. 120 Prosecution eyewitnesses testified 
that the perpetrator they identified at the trial had reddish-brown long 
hair. During the defendant's case-in-chief, the defendant called his close 
friend who testified that on the day of the shooting, the defendant's 
hair was short and black. The defendant's statement was then introduced 
110. United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980). 
111. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981). 
112. 110 S. Ct. 1176 (1990). 
113. /d. at 1179 . 
114. /d. at 1188 (Stevens, J ., dissenting). 
liS. See Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 226 (1971). 
116. Harvey. 110 S. Ct. at 1180. 
117. 110 S. Ct. 648 (1990). 
t 18. /d. at 6SO. 
119. 401 u.s. 222 (1971). 
120. /d. at 225. 
' 
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by the prosecution solely to impeach the testimony of this witness. 
Conceding that the use of the defendant's statement to impeach the 
defendant's trial testimony, had he testified, would be proper under 
. . 
Harris, the Supreme Court held that the statement may not be used to 
impeach other defense witnesses.121 The Court reasoned that the risk of 
a perjury prosecution is a much more powerful deterrent to someone 
not already on trial for serious crime. 122 The dissent asserted that Harris 
should be extended to embrace impeaching defense witnesses other than 
the defendant, especially those closely associated with the defendant, to 
deter the defendant from maneuvering his way around Harris. 123 
Although both the majority and the dissent addressed the question 
i~ only a cursory way, classic understanding of evidence is that the 
refutation of one•s statement with that of another is .not, strictly speaking, 
sincerity impeachment.124 If one person asserts mutually inconsistent 
statements, his credibility is necessarily called into question. If A says 
''red'' at one time and ''not red;' at another; he cannot be telling the 
truth all the time. If, however, A says "red'' and B says "not red," 
they cannot both be right, but one cannot determine whose credibility 
is necessarily called into question. 
C. Discovery 
In Indiana, discovery rights were expanded in Hicks v. State12' to 
permit pretrial discovery of verbatim witness statements notwithstanding 
the claim that such statements were: work product.126 This holding over~ 
rules Spears v. State. 121 The primary rationale offered by the Hicks court 
to -support the ruling was that verbatim witness statements must be 
viewed as potential substantive evidence under the rule of Patterson v. 
State .128 Pursuing this logic, the court analogized verbatim witness state-
ments to other exhibits such as photographs,: videotapes, handwriting 
examples, diagrants, and other physical evidence; the discoverability of 
such similar physical evidence is unquestioned, even if prepared by 
counsel. '29 The court perceived that discovery of these statements, like 
121. James, 110 S. Ct. at 652, 656. 
122. Id. at 653. 
123. Id. at 658 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
124. E. Cu!A.aY,. McCOllMICK ON EVIDBNCB § 47 (3d ed. 1984). 
125. 544 N.E.2d SOO (Ind. 1989). 
126. /d. at S04. 
127. ld. See Spears v. State, 272 Ind. 647, 403 N .. E.2d 828 (1980). 
128. Hiclcs, 544 ·N.E.2d at S04. See Patterson v. State. 263 Ind. ss. 324 N.E.2d 
482 ( 1975) (court -permits the substantive use of prior statements of a witness who testifies 
and is available for cross-examination). 
129. Hicks, S44 N.E.ld at S04. 
1991] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 737 
discovery of other physical evidence, would improve the efficiency of 
the criminal justice system.130 The culmination of this reasoning was the 
rejection of the work product doctrine as a shield to discovery .131 The 
court appeared to question whether such statements are protectable work 
product by observing that the "essential function of the work ·product 
exception is to protect from disclosure an attorney's 'mental impressions, 
conclusions; opinions or legal theories."' 132 The court probably does not 
believe that a verbatim witness statement falls within this definition. 
The distinction between the two rationales is important. If Hicks 
means that such statements are work product, but discoverable, because 
the statement may be offered as substantive evidence under Patterson, 133 
the parties' failure to designate the declarant of the statement as a 
potential witness could thwart pretrial discovery of the statement. This 
would result because submission of the statement as substantive evidence 
under Patterson would require the declarant to testify at trial. 134 If the 
declarant does not testify, the statement could not be admitted as sub-
stantive evidence. 135 Alternatively, if these .statements are not work prod-
uct, the ability to discover such statements would not be affected · by 
the party's designation of potential witnesses. 1~6 
The breadth of the Hicks rule was demonstrated in Crawford v. 
Superior Court of Lake County. 131 In Crawford, the trial court directed 
130. Id. 
131. /d. 
132. /d. (quoting Trial Rule IND. R. TRIAL P. 26(B)(3) (1990). 
• 133. 263 Ind. 55; 324 N.E.2d 482 (1975) . 
134. Id. at 58, 324 N .. E.2d at 484. 
135. See Watkins v. State, 446 N.E.2d 949 (Ind. 1983). 
136. Verbatim witness statements should be discoverable- without regard to whether 
the State intends to call the relator-witness. The purpose of discovery is to promote truth-
finding; it is not limited to detennining the nature of the adversary's case. M·oreover, a 
prosecutor is not a typical adversary. The prosecutor will have more resources available 
for preparation than will the ordinary defendant. A prosecutor is also atypical in that 
prosecutors are charged, in theory~. with obtaining a fair result. Truth~finding and the 
likelihood of a fair result are enhanced if the stronger ~dversary, the prosecutor, is 
.obligated to tender all relevant evidence. 
137. 549 N.E.2d 374 (Ind. 1990). Crawford sheds some light on the exact basis of 
the earlier Hicks holding. The court in Crawford noted that the State's act of listing 
potential witnesses was a sufficient basis for assuming the witnesses would testify and 
that their prior statements would be relevant. Id. at 375·76. This analysis is necessary 
only if Hicks is predicated on the assumption that witnesses'' statements are work product 
but are not protected because they may become substantive evidence if the witness testifies. 
Nevertheless, doubt remains because the trial court order that was affirmed in Crawford 
directed the State to produce :all "statements by Witnesses to police officers . . . . " /d. 
at 375. The opinion does not suggest that this particular order was confined to the 
statements of witnesses that the State intended to call at trial, although the trial court's 
first discovery order was so limited. /d. at 376. 
• 
• 
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the State to produce statements made by witnesses to police officers 
which had been reduced to writing in police reports. 138 The State objected 
on the ground that police reports are protected work product under 
State ex rei. Keaton v. Circuit Court of Rush County. 139 The court 
rejected the argument, and ruled that statements which purport to be 
the words of the witness reduced to writing as the witness spoke or 
shortly thereafter are discoverable even if they are contained in a police 
report. 140 If a police officer's opinions, impressions, and theories are 
interspersed with witness statements, an in-camera inspection by the trial 
court should be utilized to determine whether the document is essentially 
a witness statement or a privileged report. 141 
A trial court's failure to conduct an in-camera review required reversal 
in H14/ett v. State. 142 Hulett was charged with child molesting. Prior to 
the alleged incident, the child had received counseling in -relation to her 
parents' divorce. The defendant sought discovery of the counselor's file 
of the child. The trial court initially indicated it would conduct an in-
camera review, but failed to do so. Thereafter, the trial court ruled that 
the file was not discoverable on the grounds that the material was 
privileged and irrelevant, and that its tender would be oppressive and 
burdensome.143 The child testified at trial, and Hulett was convicted. 
The court of appeals declined to create a general counselor-patient 
privilege, and found that the file was unprotected in this regard. 144 The 
court also found that any ruling on relevancy was speculative because 
only the counselor knew the contents of the file. 145 Because the file 
could contain evidence of prior false accusations or inconsistent state-
ments bearing on the credibility of the testifying child, an in-camera 
inspection by the trial court was required. 146 Without such an inspection, 
the presence or absence of discoverable information could not be as-
certained. Thus, failure to conduct an in-camera inspection was reversible 
error. 
138. Crawford, 549 N.E.2d at 375. 
139. /d. at 376. See State ex rei. Keaton v. Circuit Court of Rush County, 475 
N.E.2d 1146 (Ind. 1985). 
140. Crawford. S44 N.E.2d at 376. 
141. ld. 
142. SS2 N.E.2d 47 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
143. /d. at 48. 
144. Id. at 49. 
145. /d. 
146. ld. The claim that tendering the file was unduly burdensome because of the 
need to excise references to individuals other than the child was deemed to relate more 
to the relevancy inquiry than to the claim of burdensomene$s. ld. at 50. The claim that 
the request was burdensome was only addressed in this context . 
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D. Double Jeopardy 
The United States Supreme Court decided two double jeopardy cases 
last term. Each is surprising, important, and likely to prompt a flood 
of cases in refinement. 
The first, Grady v. Corbin, 147 is arguably the year's blockbuster for 
the- practicing criminal justice professional. Justice Brennan wrote for 
the majority in this S-4 decision; thus, its longevity is in serious question.; 
After an automobile collision, the defendant was ticketed for driving 
under the influence (D.U.I.) and for crossing the center line, which are 
crimes under New York state law. An occupant in the other car died 
shortly thereafter. Through tragic noncommunication, the . pros-ecutors 
working on the traffic tickets were unaware of the fatality and the 
pendency of a homicide prosecution. The defendant pleaded guilty to 
D.U.I. and crossing the center line, and then sought to prohibit his 
prosecution for ''reckless manslaughter'' on double-jeopardy grounds. 148 
The bill of particulars in the homicide prosecution showe_d that the 
prosecution would attempt to prove recklessness through (1) D.U.I., (2) 
crossing the center line, and (3) driving too fast for conditions. The l 
Court held that the reckless manslaughter pros_ecution was barred unless 
the prosecutor first amended the bill of particulars to rely solely upon 
driving too fast for conditions, 149 The prosecutor cannot, in any retrial, 
attempt to prove conduct that is either D.U.I. or crossing the center 
line.u.o 
This decision marks a radical departure from existing doctrine. The 
Supreme Court in Blockburger v. United States151 held that offenses are 
not the "same, for double-jeopardy purposes if each requires proof of 
a material element that the other does not. 1' 2 Thus, if offenses are 
identical or one is a lesser-included offense of the other, conviction for 
both is improper. Clearly, the prosecution in this case is not barred by 
• 
Blockburger because D.U.I. and crossing the center line can be committed 
without a death ensuing and involuntary manslaughter can occur without 
the commission of these particular traffic offenses. 
Likewise, if the government had lost on a factual element common 
to the second case, the ''collateral estoppel'' extension of double jeopardy 
147. 110 S. Ct. 2084 (1990). 
148. /d. at 2086. The New York reckless manslaughter statute is equivalent to 
lndiana,s reckless homicide statute. IND. CoDE § 3542-1·5 (1988). 
149. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2086. 
150. /d. at 2094. 
151. 284 u.s., 299 (1932). 
152. /d. at 304. 
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would bar the seco,nd trial. 153 In the case at bar, however, the government 
won the earlier case. 
The Court, in a striking extension of the reach of the double jeopardy 
clause, adopted dicta in Illinois v. Vitale,ts4 and held as follows: 
As we suggested in Vitale, the Double Jeopardy Clause bars any 
subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an 
essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will 
prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant 
has already been prosecuted. This is not an ''actual evidence'' 
or "same evidence" test. The critical inquiry is what condu~t 
the state will prove, not the evidence the State will use to prove 
that conduct.1ss 
Note that the homicide prosecution is not based on a theory that the 
killing was committed during the perpetration of an unlawful act, a 
theory which would require the State to prove the unlawful act as an 
essential element of the current charge. 156 Such would be parallel to 
convicting the defendant first for arson and then prosecuting the de-
fendant for felony murder based on arson, a scenario clearly barred 
under Harris v. Ok/ahom_a. 151 The homicide theory in Grady was reck-
lessness, not unlawful act;_ recklessness may occasion the proof of un-
lawful acts such as D.U.I., but it does not require it.158 These acts of 
recklessness happen to be crimes themselves, but the theory of recklessness 
does not require proof that the underlying activity is an independent 
crime.159 For these reasons, the Grady holding extended double jeopardy 
protection well beyond its previous boundaries_. 
The Grady court's holding does not quite extend double jeopardy 
to embrace the civil notion of compulsory joinder, but it has moved a 
great distance in that direction. Until this decision is given more defi-
nition, prosecutors must be vigilant not to permit any charges to go to 
trial or plea if any part of the conduct covered thereby will form part 
of the factual content of any subsequent criminal proceeding. 160 
153. Ashe v. S_wenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
154. 447 u.s. 410 (l980). 
ISS. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2093. 
156. This would be the case in Indiana if prosecution were brought under Involuntary 
Manslaughter, IND. CODE § 35-42-1-4 (198_8), but not true under Reckless Homicide,- IND. 
CoDE § 35-42-1-5 (1988). 
157. 433 u.s. 682 (1977). 
158. Grady, 110 S. Ct. at 2094. 
159~ See IND.- CoDE § 35-42-1-5 (1988). 
160. Prosecutors will have to be careful that proof in any trial will not foreclose 
an opportunity to try other charges arising out of the same conduct, whether currently 
charged or not. Fear of a Grady foreclosure of later prosecutions may amount to a de 
facta compulsory joinder regime. If the defendant successfully moves for a severance of 
counts,_ presumably this will constitute -a waiver of the Grady protection. 
1991] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 741 
The other 1989 Supreme Court double jeopardy decision was Dowling 
v. United States. 161 In Dowling, the defendant was tried for the first 
robbery (Robbery '1) and acquitted. The defendant was then tried for 
the_ se_cond robbery (Robbery 2). At the second trial, the Government 
called a witness to identify the defendant as the perpetrator of Robbery 
1, an identification the Court assumed would otherwise fit under the 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) exception to character evidence. 162 The 
defendant conceded admissibility under Rule 404(b), but claimed that 
any reference to his identity in Robbery 1 was barred by double jeopardy 
because it would force him, in effect; to relitigate issues on which he 
had already prevailed. 163 The Court held 6-3 that there was no consti .. 
tutional violation, and that this identification testimony was admissible. 164 
Relying on a subtle distinction in the applicable burdens of proof, the 
Court noted that the first trial demonstrated only that the defendant 
was not identified as the perpetrator in Robbery 1 beyond a reasonable 
doubt-. 16$ The standard for Rule-404(b) evidence of other crimes, however, 
is only a preponderance of the evidence under Huddleston v. United 
States.t66- Because the Robbery 2 trial court found by a preponderance 
that the defendant committed Robbery l, the prior acquittal did not 
bar the testimony .167 Thus, past s_pecific instances of misconduct that 
have been litigated to acquittal stand on the same footing as those that 
have not yet been litigated. If the prosecution can persuade the trial 
court by a preponderance of the evidence that such crimes occurred, 
they are admissible if they fit the Rule 404(b) exception to character 
evidence.168 
The dissent raised an interesting question: If the standard of proof 
for sentencing purposes of past misconduct including crimes is less than 
beyond a reasonable doubt as it typically is, could a prior acquittal be 
used to enhance a sentence?169 There are Indiana cases to the contrary, 170 
but they are prior to Dowling. 111 
161. 110 S. Ct. 668 (1990). 
162. Indiana courts recognize the 404(b) exception to character evidence. See 12 R. 
Mn,I.ER, INDIANA EVIDENCE 26S-94 (1984), which describes the admissibility of prior _acts 
to prove intent, motive, kno_wledge, malice, sanity, scheme or plan, capacity to commit 
offense, identity, and depraved sexual instinct. 
163. Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 672. 
164. Id. at 61S. 
I6S. Id. at 672-73. 
166. 485 u.s. 681 (1988). 
167. Dowling, 110 S. Ct. at 673. 
168. /d. 
169. /d. at 680 (Brennen, J ., dissenting). 
170. See, e.g., McNew v. State, 271 Ind. 214, 391 N.E.2d 607 (1979). 
171.. See infra § lli(H). 
• 
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ln Tyson v. State,112 the Fourth District Court of Appeals confronted 
a vexing manifest-necessity scenario.173 The defendant's trial for burglary 
and theft had commenced (hence, jeopardy had attached), and unex-
pectedly a critical prosecution witness who was under subpoena vanished. 
The prosecution moved for a mistrial, which the court granted over the 
defendant's objection. The defendant was convicted at a subsequent trial 
after having properly preserved his double jeopardy challenge. 174 
The question presented was whether the absence of the witness was 
''manifest necessity'' so as to permit a second trial after a mistrial of 
the first. 175 The majority held that it was not manifest necessity because 
once having subjected defendant to jeopardy, the state was bound to 
see the case to conclusion even if its witnesses became unavailable~ 176 
The dissent, while recognizing that the majority'-s position would be true 
as a general rule, noted that the combination of the following factors 
should have led to a different result in this_ case: (1) the witness had 
been served with subpoena; (2) the witness drove the getaway car; (3) 
the witness was the only one who saw the defendant at scene; (4) the 
witness had an ongoing friendship with the defendant; and (5) this 
friendship appeared to be the reason for her absconding~ 171 Thus, the 
dissent argued, applying the double jeopardy bar in this case placed an 
unfair burden on the State. 178 
This issue is a difficult one~ It seems harsh to charge either the 
prosecution or the defendant with the witness's absconding in the absence 
of proof of connivance. Presumably, if the State could show that the 
defendant participated in the disappearance, no constitutional violation 
could be shown. 179 Nor will it ordinarily be clear that a mistrial will 
help the prosecution; after all, if th,e witness runs away out of friendship 
for the defendant, why should one assume that, once discovered, her 
testimony will be what the State hopes? 180 In the first trial, the prosecution 
172. 543 N.E.ld 415 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
173. "M.mfest necessity,. is a doctrine permitting retrial after a mistrial caused 
through no egregious fault of the prosecution. See IND. CooE § 35-41-4-3 (1988). 
f 174. The appellate record does not indicate whether this critical witness testified at 
the second trial, a rather astounding omission. 
175. The manifest necessity exception to double_ jeopardy is codified in IND. CooE 
§ lS-41-4-3 (1988). 
f76. Tyson. S43 N.E.2d at 419-20. 
177. ld. at 420 (Chezum. J., dissenting). 
178. ld. 
179. ld. 
l80. Of course, in this case, the appellate court addressed the question after the 
second trial, though the record does not tell the reader whether the absent witness testified 
and, if so, how. Ordinarily, however, double-jeopardy challenges precede the second trial 
because being forced to undergo the second trial is part of what the clause protects against. 
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had called other witnesses and presumably could have let the case proceed 
to jury determination. The majority's fear was that prosecutors will 
begin to use "manifest necessity" when their evidence is not evolving 
as strongly as it might in a later trial.181 If the missing witness cannot 
be shown to be critically important, this fear becomes more realistic. 
E. Confrontation 
The United States Supreme Court decided two confrontation cases 
last term, each arising from the tension between the defendant's sixth 
amendment confrontation interests, the cross-examination interest and 
the face-to-face interest, and the state's need for the testimony of minor 
children in sexual abuse cases._ The Court rejected an attempt to introduce 
a child's hearsay statement through a relator, thus maintaining the 
strength of the cross-examination interest, 182 but permitted cross-examined 
testimony of a child witness separated from the courtroom, thus weak-
ening the face-to-face interest.~83 
In Idaho v. Wright, 184 the trial court permitted a physician to relate 
the statements of a two-and-a-half-year-old child. It had been determined 
that the child could not possibly give meaningful testimony at ttial._•ss 
Though conceding that the- testimony included he.~say, the trial court 
found that the child's statement bore sufficient indicia of reliability to 
fit the Idaho "residual" or "catch-all" exception, the functional equiv-
alent of Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (24); 186 and therefore rejected the 
defendant's confrontation claim. 
The Supreme Court began by assuming that the child was unavailable, 
thus paving the way for a hearsay admission, but held that under the 
confrontation clause, indicia of reliability were insuffieient to admit the 
evidence. 187 Indeed, as the Court noted, there are many reasons to be-
181. Tyson, 543 N.E.2d at 419. 
182. Idaho v. Wright, 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). 
183. Maryland v. Craig, 110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). 
184. 110 S. Ct. 3139 (1990). 
185. ld. at 3141. 
186. The drafters of the Federal Rules of Evidence noted that the historical de-
velopment of hearsay exceptions was often frustrated by cases in which everyone appreciated 
the high trustworthiness of given hearsay, but could not fit it within an existing "pi-
geonhole.'' Often, to .admit the evidence. courts would expand the most appropriate 
pigeonhole. Over time, this had the effect of creating exceptions that would accommodate 
hearsay that was not at all trustworthy. "Hard cases_ make bad law." To avoid a repeat 
of this process, the drafters inserted a ''residual" exception to hearsay. See FED. R. Evm. 
803(24) and 804(b)(5). Under these rubrics, the court can admit highly trustworthy hearsay 
without destroying the integrity of the other historical exceptions. 
l87. Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3152 . 
• 
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particularly suspicious of these statements in sexual abuse cases.188· Thus, 
the Court affirmed the· state supreme court's reversal of the conviction.189 
The opinion reaffirmed that if a statement fits a "firmly rooted" ex-
ception to the hearsay rule, it will pass muster under the confrontation 
clause . 190 However, cases under the "residual" exception must be mon-
itored on a case-by-case basis for sufficient indicia of reliability to meet 
a confrontation challenge. 191 
Maryland v. Craig19'J. began the refinement of the face-to-face pro.., 
tection of Coy v._ Iowa. 193 If the trial court determines, in. an individual 
case, that testimony in the courtroom will cause a child witness to suffer 
serious emotional ·distress such that the child cannot reasonably com-
municate, the trial court may arrange a closed-circuit process that sep-
arates the child from the courtroom.194 Craig suggests that the method 
used in this case is permissible, though other methods may also be 
permissible. 19' Here the witness, prosecutor.. and defense counsel were 
in a separate room, all viewable by judge, jury, and defendant, and the 
defendant was in direct audio contact with his attorney. The child could 
not see the defendant or others in the courtroom. The Supreme Court. 
pointed o.ut that there had been a particularized holding by the trial 
court that the child's view of the defendant would have caused trauma. 
If, however, a trial court should find that the problem is not the presence· 
of the defendant, but rather the general counroom setting, the defendant 
should join the others in the separate room to give the fullest protection 
to the defendant's face-to-face interest.t96 
The Indiana Court of Appeals for the First District had occasion 
to review the "face-to-face" aspect of confrontation in Casada v. State. 197 
Defendant, the step-father of the alleged victim, E.T., was convicted of 
two counts of attempted child molesting, a class C felony .198 At the 
trial, thirteen-year-old E. T .199 became so distraught on the stand that 
she could not respond to the first question asked on direct examination 
by the prosec.ution. After a short recess, the trial court ordered a six .. 
foot by four-foot chalkboard to be placed betweell the witness and the 
188. 
189. 
190. 
l91. 
1'92. 
193. 
194. 
195. 
196. 
197. 
198. 
199 .. 
Jd. at 31St. 
Id. at 31S3. 
See United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387 (1986). 
' 
Wright, 110 S. Ct. at 3152. 
110 S. Ct. 3157 (1990). 
487 u.s. 1012 (1.988). 
Craig, 110 S. Ct. at 3170. 
/d. at 3.167-68. 
Id. at 3169. 
S44 N.E.2d 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
IND. CODE § 3S-42-4-3(c) (1988). 
She was 12 years old at the time of the alleged incident. 
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defendant in an attempt to decrease the witness's anxiety. She was then 
able to give testimony; indeed, the chalkboard was removed during cross 
and redirect examination. 
In a carefully reasoned opinion, Judge Ratliff first reviewed the 
history of the confrontation clauses of the United States and Indiana 
constitutions with particular attention to the recently re ... emerging em-
phasis on face-to-face viewing.200 The opinion notes that for witnesses 
under ten years of age, the legislature has provided some guidance in 
this area. 201 These provisions did not apply to the case at bar due to 
the witness's age. In any event, the statutes were not intended as the 
exclusive word on the subject, and a trial court is free to fashion other 
remedies to balance the government's legitimate interests (including the 
development of testimony) against the defendant's interests in a face-
to-face encounter.202 The core of the holding is_ that a witness's mere 
. . 
nervousness or temporary inability to testify is not, without further 
inquiry, sufficient to overcome the defendant's strong constitutional 
interests.203 A chalkboard or other suitable barrier can, in an appropriate 
case, be a permissible technique;. however, the trial court in this case 
had exanlined no witnesses to determine if the witness would or would 
not be able to reasonably communicate without such apparatus. Either 
further inquiry or' less drastic means, such as a recess to per1nit the 
witness to collect composure, should have preceded the use of the 
barrier. 204 
' 
F. Scientific Evidence 
Although this Article does not embrace the discipline of ''evidence,'' 
no criminal law survey could be complete without noting that Indiana 
has joined the growing list of states that have, by statute, accepted 
forensic DNA205 analysis as sufficiently scientific for use in court. 206 
G. Trial 
1. Jury Selection. During his state court trial, a white defendant 
objected to the prosecutor's use of two peremptory challenges to strike 
200. Caada, S44 N.E.2d at 189. See also Coy v. Iowa, 108 S. Ct. 2798 (1988) 
(the leading case on the sixth-amendment application); Miller v. State, S3l N .E.2d 466 
(1988) (the leading case on article I, section 13 of the Indiana Constitution). 
201. IND. CODB §§ 35-]7,4 6 and 35-37-4-8 (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
202. Casada, 544 N.E.2d at 196. 
203. ld. 
204. /d. 
205. Deoxyribonucleic Acid. 
206. IND. Coos § 35-37-4-10 {Supp. 1990). 
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the only two blacks· on the venire panel from the petit jury. In Holland 
v. lllinois,201 Holland, the defendant, preserved both the sixth amendment 
fair cross-section claim and the equal protection claim in the Illinois 
state courts. Unfortunately, Holland pursued only the fair cross-section 
claim before the United States Supreme· Court. 
Because every defendant has a sixth amendment right to a venire 
designed to provide a fair cross-section of the community, the Court 
concluded that Holland had standing to raise the sixth amendment claim 
even though he was not a member of a systematically excluded group.208 
Nevertheless,. the Court rejected the claim on the merits. The Court 
adhered to its ruling in Lockhard v. McCree'-09 that the fair cross-section 
requirement applies only to the venire panel and not to the petit jury. 210 
The fair cross .. section requirement was viewed as a .means of assuring 
an impartial jury, not a representative jury.211 To this end, the fair cross-
section requires that the venire stage can be disrupted at the petit jury 
stage to serve the State's legitimate interest in obtaining an impartial 
jury.212 The State, therefore, may use peremptory challenges to eliminate 
jurors belonging. to groups it believes would unduly favor the other side. 
' 
The fair cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment is not 
offended by such conduct even if the strikes are· based on racial groupings 
because (1) the fair cross-section requirement applies to the venire panel 
and not to petit juries and (2) disrupting the cross-section provided by 
the venire is often necessary to secure an impartial jury.213 Indeed, the 
Court indicated that the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury 
would be impaired, if not lost, by any rule requiring that the ·petit jury 
reflect a fair cross ... section of the community.214 Holland v. Illinois ex-
plicitly holds that although use of peremptory challenges based on race 
• 
may violate the equal protection clause,. it does not violate the sixth 
amendment's fair cross-section requirement.2u 
The more~ interesting aspect of Holland is Justice Kennedy's con-
curring opinion in the S-4 decision. Justice Kennedy noted that the 
decision does not alter the rule that exclusion of jurors, based on race, 
violates the equal protection clause.216 Justice Kennedy also stated that 
207. 110 S. Ct. 803 (1990). 
208. /d. at 805. 
209. 476 u.s. 162 (1986). 
210. Holland~ 110 S. Ct., at 806 (citing Lockhard v. McCreet 476 U.S. 162, 174 
(1986)). 
211. Id. at 807. 
212. ld. at 809. 
213. Id. at 808 .. 
214. /d. 
215. Id. at 806. 
216. /d. at 811 (Kennedy, J ., concurring) (citing Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 
(1986)). 
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a white defendant would have standing to raise the claim.217 Coupled 
with the four dissenters, Justice Kennedy would have been the fifth vote 
to find the equal protection claim available to any defendant. Thus, 
Holland would have been deemed to have standing on the equal protection 
claim had he pursued it. However, because one of the dissenters, Justice 
Brennan, has retired, the ultimate resolution of this particular standing 
question remains unclear. 
The language in Holland regarding standing on the equal protection 
claim raises questions regarding the viability of the Indiana case law 
dealing with Batson issues. Batson issues also were addressed most 
recently by the Indiana Supreme Court in Minniefield v. State.218 In 
Minniefield, two black defendants were tried on robbery charges. The 
State's evidence included a slip of paper taken from the victim's pocket 
which was recovered during a search of one of the defendants. Racist 
jokes were written on the paper. It appeared that the source of the 
racist jokes was the victim. As a .matter of strategy, the. State used six 
peremptory challenges to strike one white and five black prospective 
jurors, leaving a petit jury of one black and eleven white persons. The 
defense objecte.d based on .Batson v. Kentucky}19 
On appeal to the Indiana Supreme Court, the convictions were 
reversed. 220 The court ruled that to establish a denial of equal protection, 
a defendant must show the following: (1) He is a member of a cognizable 
racial group; (2) the prosecutor peremptorily challenged members of the 
defendant's race; and (3) the circumstances raise an inference that the 
prosecutor excluded veniremen because of their race.221 Once a defendant 
demonstrates as much, the State must provide a neutral explanation . 222 
In Minniefield, the defendants clearly offered circumstances that 
raised the inference that the prosecution excluded jurors based on race. 
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected strategic grounds as a neutral 
explanation.223 Likewise, the court rejected the State's claim that the 
challenges were not based on the jurors' "racial" identity with the 
defendant.2:M The majority found that the use of peremptory challenges 
based on race is a per se violation of the equal protection clause.m 
217. Id. at 811-:12 (Kennedy, J .• concurring). 
218. 539 N.E.2d 464 (Ind. 1989). Minniefield was discussed in last year's survey 
article. See Kammen & Polito, Criminal Low and Procedure. Survey of Recent Developments 
in Indiana Law, 22 IND. L .. REv. 303 (1990). 
219. 476 u.s. 79 (1986). 
220. Minniefield, 539 N.E.2d at 467. 
221. /d. at 466. 
222. /d. 
223. Id~ 
224. /d. 
225. /d. 
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The viability of the Minniefield requirement that the challenged jurors 
be members of the defendant's race is questionable. Again, the Holland 
opinion demonstrated the existence of five votes that would hold that 
all defendants have standing to challenge the exclusion of jurors based 
on race on equal protection grounds.226 Four members of the majority 
in Holland did not express their views on the issue. At worst, Justice 
Brennan',s retirement means the vote would be 4-4 leaving the Court-'s 
newest member, Justice Souter, in the tie-breaker position. Accordingly, 
all defendants should preserve the Batson issue, if it arises during jury 
selection, notwithstanding the Minniefield requirement that the defendant 
and the challenged jurors be members of the same racial group. 
2. Waiver. According to the Indiana Court of Appeals decision 
in Phillips v. State,227 forfeiture of the right to be present for trial 
requires -sufficient evidence to support a finding that the waiver was 
knowing and intelligent. 228 Phillips, a Missouri attorney, proceeded pro 
se. The record was unclear about whether Phillips had, received notice 
of pretrial and trial dates. When Phillips called the prosecutor to ascertain 
the trial date, he was advised that the trial had occurred a few days 
earlier. Not surprisingly, Phillips, had lost. 
On appeal, the court held that the right to be present at trial is 
fundamental to a fair trial.22' As a consequence, waiver of the right 
would be controlled by the standard of Johnson v. Zerbst.230 A finding 
of waiver must be supported by evidence sufficient to show an intentional 
relinquishment of a known right.231 A statement by the court reporter 
that notice of the trial date would have been mailed to the defendant 
. . . . . . 
is insufficient to support such a finding. 232 Evidence sufficient to meet 
the standard should demonstrate that the defendant knew of the trial 
date and, by his absence, intended to avoid trial.233 
3. Instructions. In the Indiana Supreme Court decision of Madden 
v. State,234 the trial court had instructed the jury that "[i]t is not essential 
in this cause that the testimony of the prosecuting witness be corroborated 
by other evidence-. It is sufficient if, from all the evidence, you believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the crimes wtre committed by the 
Defendant as alleged. " 235 Madden, the defendant, objected on the ground 
226. Holland,- 110 S. Ct. at 813 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
227. S4l N.E.ld 646 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
228. ld. at 648. 
229. ld. 
230. 304 U.S. 4S8 (1938). 
231. Phillips, S43 N.E.2d at 648. 
232. ld. 
233. Id. at 649. 
234. S49 N.E.2d 1030 (Ind. 1990), 
235. /d. at 1033. 
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that the instruction over-emphasized the victim's testimony. On appeal. 
the majority recognized that when more than one witness testifies, it is 
improper for a trial court to comment on or emphasize a particular 
witness's. testimony.236 Nevertheless, the majority concluded that because 
only the victim had testified regarding identification of the accused and 
the acts he had perpetrated on her, 237 and because her testimony need 
not be corroborated, the instruction was appropriate.238 
In his dissent, Justice DeBruler provided a powerful condemnation 
of the instruction. The rule suggesting that a conviction may rest on 
the uncorroborated testimony of the victim is an appellate standard of 
review, not a standard to be applied by the trier of fact.239 Justice 
DeBruler also noted that lack of corroboration is a legitimate element 
for the trier of fact to consider in determining the credibility of witnesses 
and the weight to be accorded to such testimony.240 The instruction, 
however, strongly suggested that the jury should not consider the lack 
of corroboration as it affects the witness's credibility or the weight of 
the testimony. Last, a general instruction on credibility and weight, 
applicable to all testimony, could include an explanation regarding cor-
roboration to provide a balanced and fair instruction. Given all this, 
Justice DeBruler would have found that the challenged instruction ~as 
improper because it called special and specific attention to an individual 
witness, namely the State's key witness.241 
In another jury instruction case, Pinegar v. State,242 the Indiana 
Court of Appeals found that the defenses of heat of passion and self-
defense are not inherently inconsistent. 243 If there is evidence to support 
each defense, both should be submitted to the jury. Pinegar was a 
homicide case in which the evidence demonstrated that the victim sought 
the confrontation and struck the first blow. The trial court instructed 
on self..;defense, but refused to instruct on voluntary manslaughter, that 
is, murder mitigated by sudden heat. The court of appeals rejected the 
State's assertion that dicta in Ward v. Stattfl44 compelled the conclusion 
236. /d. 
-237 .. The significance of this statement is unclear. That an individual witness is the 
only witness on a particular point is the norm in multiwitness trials. Trials in which all 
witnesses testify on all issues are atypical. Focusing special attention on the- testimony of 
a single witness has been previously condemned, as Justice DeBruler observed in Hackett 
v. State, 266 Ind. 103, 360 N.E,.2d 1000 (1977). 
238. Madden, S49 N.E.2d at 1033. 
239. ld. at 1035 (DeBrueler, J., dissenting). 
240. /d. 
241. ld. at 1036. 
242.. S53 N.E.2d S2S (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
243. /d. at 528. 
244. 519 N.E.2d S61 (Ind. 1988)., 
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that killing in sudden heat was inherently inconsistent with self-defense.24s 
The Indiana Supreme Court stated that the particular facts of Ward 
presented a self-defense, not a sudden heat, question.246 The Court of 
Appeals found the language restricted to the facts of Ward.247 Both 
defenses can admit the existence of the crime of murder, which is the 
knowing or intentional killing of another human being.248 Self-defense 
offers a complete defense, that is, the knowing and intentional killing 
was justified because the use of deadly force was necessary to prevent 
serious bodily injury to oneself or others.249 Heat of passion offers a 
partial defense; that is, the knowing or intentional killing occurred while 
acting under the sudden heat of passion. 2so 
When the accused is actually provoked and responds, self-defense 
and sudden heat both may be appropriate. The jury, not the court, 
should determine whether the force utilized was reasonable (self-defense), 
or whether the force was excessive, but utilized in the sudden heat 
generated by the initial attack (voluntary manslaughter).~• Thus, if the 
facts warrant, the trial court should charge the jury on both defenses. 
H. Guilty Pleas 
The Indiana Supreme Court retreated from yet another aspect of 
previously fixed rules pertaining to guilty pleas, as originally set forth 
in German v. State.252 In German, the court held that a trial judge must 
personally inform the defendant of all the rights, among other things, 
forfeited by a guilty plea. 253 Failure to do so would require reversal. 2s4 
In White v. State,2s' the Indiana Supreme Court limited the German 
rule, and' 'held that only the trial court's failure to inform the defendant 
of the right to a jury trial, the right of confrontation, or the right 
against self-incrimination requires automatic reversal.2s6 Other omissions 
must be coupled with a sbowing that the omission actually rendered the 
plea involuntary or unintelligent.257 
245. Pinegar~ 533 N.E.2d at 528. 
246. Ward, 519 N.E.2d at S63. 
247. /d. 
248. IND. CODE § 35-42-1·1 (l988 & Supp. 1990). 
249. /d. § 3541-3-2 (1988). 
250. /d. § 35-42-l-3. 
251. Pinegar, 533 N.E.ld at 528~ 
252. 428 N.E.2d 234 (Ind. 1981). 
253. /d. at 236. 
254. /d. at 237. 
255. 497 N .E.2d 893 (Ind. 1986). 
256~ /d. at 905-06. 
257. /d. at 901. 
• 
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In Youngblood v. State,2' 8 the supreme court, without reference to 
German, ruled that a guilty plea record devoid of any personal advisement 
by the trial court may be rehabilitated by the later presentation of 
evidence. 2' 9 The court rejected the existence of any right to an advisement 
by the trial court.260 The defense counsel's postconviction testimony that 
the defendant was advised of his rights by · counsel was sufficient to 
establish that the original plea was voluntary and intelligent.261 
Justice DeBruler dissented, and equated the personal advisement rule 
with Miranda rights.262 The purpose of the rule is to safeguard the 
underlying rights.263 By requiring a colloquy between the trial judge and 
the defendant, the record would reflect not only the defendant's knowl-
edge of the rights but also a manifestation of a freely made decision 
to forego those rights.264 Rehabilitation of the record by postconviction 
testimony may demonstrate the defendant's knowledge of his rights, but 
it may not provide any manifestation of a decision to forego the rights 
freely made . by the defendant.265 In Youngblood, no manifestation of 
waiver was presented. Nevertheless, the majority found the plea to be 
valid.266 
Prosecutorial "persuasion" in the form of an offer to forego filing 
a habitual offender count in exchange for an immediate, uncounseled 
guilty plea was addressed by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Hood v. 
State.261 Hood was arrested on April 25, 1986 and incarcerated. Prior 
to his initial hearing, a prosecutor approached Hood and offered to 
forego filing a habitual offender count if Hood immediately pleaded 
guilty, without counsel, to the charged offenses of theft and forgery. 
Hood pleaded guilty, and thereafter sought post-conviction relief. 
On appeal, the court acknowledged that a defendant can be threat ... 
ened with the filing of an habitual count to induce a plea. 268 Thus, the 
prosecutor in Hood could make use of such a threat. However, the 
prosecutor's insistence on an uncounseled plea was not permissible.269 
258. 542 N.E.2d 188 (Ind. 1989). 
259. /d. at 189. 
260. /d. 
261. /d. 
262. !d. at 190 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). 
263. ld. 
264. ld. 
265. /d. 
266. Id. at 189. 
267. 546 N.E.2d 847 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
268. Id. at 849. Courts see little differen~e between an offer to forego filing the 
habitual count to induce a plea and the practice of filing the habitual count and subsequently 
offering to dismiss it in exchange for a plea. See generally Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 
U.S. 357 (1978); Jackson v. State, 499 N.E.2d 21S (Ind. 1986). 
269. Hood, S46 N.E.2d at 849. 
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The court suggested that plea bargaining is premised on the notion 
that a defendant, advised by counsel and protected by procedural safe-
guards, is capable of making intelligent choices. 270 ''Conversely, un-
counseled defendants are considered incapable of intellig.ent 
choices .... " 271 Uncounseled defendants generally are not informed of 
matters involving likelihood of conviction, probable punishment, and 
the legal consequences of their conduct. 
In addition to stating its view on the value of counsel in plea 
bargaining, the court referred to federal cases holding that counsel or 
a valid waiver of counsel is a prerequisite to permissible plea bargaining. 
Thus, the court appeared to be ready to decide that prosecutorial plea 
bargaining with an uncounseled defendant vitiates the voluntariness of 
any resulting plea; however, the court did not decide that issue. The 
court found that the facts in Hood were more egregious than that of 
a defendant who simply negotiated without counsel because the prosecutor 
in Hood insisted that the defendant waive the right to counsel.272 The 
court concluded that the State's act of conditioning its offer on the 
defendant's agreement to forego counsel rendered the plea per se in-
voluntary.273 Voluntariness was not restored by the defendant's waiver 
of counsel at the guilty plea hearing because that waiver was tainted 
by the State's prior action.274 
I. Sentencing 
The Indiana courts of appeal decided three significant cases dealing 
with the use of "aggravating circumstances" at sentencing. The Indiana 
Supreme Court holding in Willoughby v. State'-75 authorizes a trial court 
to consider uncharged criminal conduct as an aggravating circumstance 
for purposes of sentencing.276 Willoughby was convicted of murder, 
robbery, and confinement. During the police investigation on those 
charges, Willoughby admitted that he disposed of a body in 1975 and 
that he did not report the event to authorities. This prior conduct was 
unrelated to the charges actually brought against him. At the time of 
sentencing, the trial court found that the prior unrelated conduct was 
an aggravating circumstance.277 Willoughby's sentence was enhanced for 
this and other reasons. 
• 
270. /d. 
271. /d. 
272. /d. 
273. /d. 
274. /d. at 850. 
215. S52 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 1990). 
276. /d. at 470. 
277. /d. at 471. 
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On appeal, the- Indiana Supreme Court concluded that the prior 
unrelated conduct properly could be considered as evidence that Wil-
loughby was a criminal accessory after the fact.278 The fact that the 
conduct had not resulted in a conviction or even in the filing of a 
charge did not preclude its use at sentencing. The court relied on Starks 
v. State'-19 to support its holding.280 Starks, however, involved pending 
charges .. Arguably, as the concurring and dissenting opinion suggested, 
pending charges should be considered, not as evidence of criminal con-
duct, but as evidence that the prior exercise of police authority over 
the defendant has had no deterrent effect. 281 
Use of either prior arrest records or uncharged conduct as evidence 
of prior criminal activity is problematic. The problem arises because the 
evidentiary rules applicable to trial do not apply to sentencing proceed-
ings. 282 Thus; for example, hearsay is admissible. Few courts have de-
veloped any guidelines to ensure that the evidence of uncharged criminal 
conduct is reliable" Indiana courts have not done so, nor has Indiana 
addressed the scope of a defe~dant's right to challenge such assertions. 
A defendant confronted with such evidence should be entitled to adequate 
notice and a hearing to challenge the State's evidence and offer a 
response.283 Thus, defendants c_onfronted with such _allegations should 
make a record on the issue. 
ln Conwell v. State,284 the court of appeals found that when a 
defendant pleads guilty to a lesser-included offense, the trial court may 
not use the element that distinguishes the lesser from the greater offense 
as an aggravating factor. 285 Conwell was charged with burglary. The 
charge was classified as a B felony because_ the building involved was 
a dwelling. He pleaded guilty to burglary as a C felony pursuant to a 
plea agreement. At sentencing, the trial court found that the defendant's 
lack of any criminal history was a_ mitigating circumstance. The court 
also found an aggravating circumstance the burglarized building was 
278. Id~ at 470. 
279. 489 N.E.2d 43 (Ind. 1986). 
280. Willoughby, SS2 N.E.2d at 470. 
281. /d. at 471 (DeBruler,_ J., concurring and dissenting). 
282. See Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). 
283. It is reasonable to assume that the procedural protections which attach to a 
sentencing hearing would at least be equal to those available in parole revocation hearings. 
See Morrissey v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (right to· notice, disclosure of the State's 
evidence, opportunity to be heard and to present witnesses, cross~xamine, and confrontation 
unless good cause is shown). See also Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. S39 (1974) (in prison 
disciplinary hearing, defendant has right to adequate notice and to call witnesses to respond 
to the allegations). 
284. S42 N.E.2d 1024 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989). 
285. Id. at 1025. 
• 
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a dwelling. Conwell was sentenced to eight years, a presumptive term 
of five years with three years added for aggravating circumstances. 
The court of appeals analogized Conwell's situation to the facts of 
Hammons v. State.2~ In Hammons, the Indiana Supreme Court found 
that a trial court may not impose the maximum sentence on the lesser 
offense to c_ompensate for the perceived error made by a jury in acquitting 
the defendant on the greater charge. 287 The court of appeals found no 
distinction between a jury verdict and a plea of guilty. 288 In either case, 
the element that distinguishes the greater from the lesser offense may 
not be used to enhance the defendant's sentence.289 
The last noteworthy case decided in Indiana pertaining to aggravating 
circumstances is Lane v. State.290 In Lane, a trial court utilized as an 
aggravating factor the fact that the defendant, as a juvenile, had been 
adjudicated as a CHINS (Children In Need of Services). Noting that 
juveniles adjudged to be CHINS are victims of their circumstances, not 
juvenile criminals, the court of appeals reversed.291 Although a juvenile 
history of criminal acts can serve as an aggravating circumstance,292 one's 
status as a CHINS may not so serve. 
The next noteworthy sentencing case is the Indiana Supreme Court's · 
decision in Seay v. State.293 From July 14, 1986 to September 2, 1986, 
the defendant sold controlled substances on four occasions to an un-
dercover policeman and an informant. In February 1987, the defendant 
was tried on the two counts that arose from the first two sales. He 
was convicted, found to be an habitual offender, and sentenced to sixty 
years. While the jury was deliberating in that case, the State filed two 
new counts based on the last two sales, and again sought the habitual 
offender enhancement. Seay was tried on the new charges, found guilty, 
and sentenced to sixty years fifteen years on each count, consecutive 
to one another with one count enhanced by thirty years for the 
habitual finding. This sentence was imposed consecutive to the first 
sentence of sixty years. 
Seay challenged the second trial on various grounds. On appeal, the 
supreme court rejected the claim that the State was required to join the 
286. 493 N.E.2d 1250 (Ind. 1986). 
287. Id. at 1253. 
288. Conwell, S42 N .. E.2d at 102S. 
289. /d. 
290. 551 N.E.2d 897 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990). 
291. ld. at 899. 
292. See Jordan v. State, S12 N.E.2d 407 (Ind.), reh. denied, Sl6 N.E.2d 1054 
(Ind. 1987). 
293. SSO N.E.2d 1284 (Ind. 1990). 
1991] CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 755 
four charges in one prosecution, as well as the claim that collateral 
estoppel barred the second prosecution. 294 However, relying on Starks 
v. State,29$ the court found that the State is barred from seeking multiple 
habitual offender enhancements by bringing successive prosecutions for 
charges that could have been consolidated for trial.296 Thus, whether the 
,; 
State seeks two habitual offender enhancements in one trial or ,separates 
the charges by initially withholding the filing of all available charges, 
the State may not secure consecutive habitual offender enhancements.297 
Last, pertaining to sentencing, the legislature provided two significant 
developments. First, the presumptive sentence for a class C felony was 
reduced from five to four years; four years, instead of three, may now 
be added for aggravating circumstances; and two years, instead of three, 
subtracted for mitigating circumstances.298 In short, the sentencing range 
for a class_ C felony remains two to eight years, only the presumptive 
sentence is changed. The presumptive sentence for a class D felony was 
reduced from two years to a year and a half.299 A year and a half, 
instead of two, may be added for aggravating, circumstances.300 There 
294. /d. at 1288. Indiana's statutory bars to subsequent prosecutions are set forth 
in IND. CODE § 35-34-1-IO(c) (198'8) and IND. CODE § 35-41-4-4 (1988). Both speak in 
terms of bars to prosecutions for offenses that ucould have been joined" or "should 
have been charged.'' Nevertheless. case law interpretations have preserved to the State 
the right not to pursue all charges in a unified action. See Webb v. State, 453 N.E.2d 
180 (Ind~ 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1081 (1984). Thus, without fear of any subsequent 
bar, the State may separate offenses by not filing some of the charges. even if all the 
offenses were committed at the same time or during the same criminal episode. But see 
Grady v. Corbin, 110 S~ Ct. 2084 (1990) (double jeopardy discussion regarding offenses 
involving the same conduct). 
295. 523 N.E.2d 135 (Ind. 1988) (trial courts lack the power to require that habitual 
offender sentences run consecutively when meting out several sentences). 
296. Seay. SSO N.E.2d at 1288. It is interesting to note that the court, for purposes 
of determining jf a bar to subsequent prosecution existed. found the mandatory joinder 
requirement of Indiana Code § 35-34-1-1 O(b) applicable only to charges actually filed. 
IND. CoDE § 35-34-1-lO(b) (1988) (mandatory duty to join related charges arising_ to 
common scheme or plan). Yet. the court found that the second set of charges against 
Seay, which were not filed until after the first trial, could have been joined with the 
initial charges for purposes of determining that pyramiding habitual offender _sentences 
could not be sought. Seay, SSO N.E.2d at 1288. It appears that the State retains the 
ability to withhold charges and force separate trials, but loses part of the incentive to 
do so. 
297. Oddly, in Starks, 523 N.E.2d at 737, the remand order directed the_ trial court 
to order the two habitual offender enhanced sentences to run concurrently. but in Seay, 
the remand order directed the trial court to vacate the- habitual offender sentence en-
hancement. Seay, SSO N.E.2d at 1289. 
298. IND. CoDB § 35-S0-2-6 (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
'299.. /d. § 35-S0-2-1~ 
300. ld. 
• 
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was no change in the possible one-year reduction for mitigating circum-
'stances. The range for a class D felony is now one-half year to three 
years instead of one to four years. 
The second legislative development was the approval of the •'Boot 
Camp For Youthful Offenders.''301 This statute is intended to allow the 
Department of Corrections to create a facility for youthful offenders 
that provides a paramilitary environment emphasizing discipline, physical 
development, treatment intervention, and value modification. 302 The pro-
gram is limited to youthful offenders between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five years, with no prior convictions who al-e serving a sentence. 
of less than eight years.303 If the boot camp is successfully completed, 
the offender is returned to the sentencing court for further disposition. 304 
, 
The concept has not been implemented yet for want of funding.30' 
J. Post-conviction 
The United States Supreme Court continued its practice of gutting 
a defendant's right to a meaningful federal review of state court con-
victions.306 In Butler v. McKellar,'Jm the Court "fine tuned" the rule 
that in both capital and noncapital cases, ''new rules will not be applied 
• 
or announced in cases on collateral review unless they fall into one of 
two exceptions."308 The exceptions are as follows: (1) The new rule 
places the conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority 
to proscribe; and (2) the new rule is implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty. 309 
301. /d. §§ 11-14-J ... J to 4 4 (Supp. 1990). 
302. /d. § 11-14-2-S. 
303. /d. § 11-14-1-S. 
304. Id. § 11-14·4 4. 
JOS. Conversation with Hon. Raymond D. Kickbush, Judge. Porter Circuit Court 
(March 12, 1991) (Judge Kickbush was the principal ·proponent of the boot-camp concept.). 
306. See generally Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), overruling Fay v. Noia, 
372 U.S. 391 (1963) (a state procedural default ban habeas relief only if the petitioner 
deliberately bypassed the state courts, and the petitioner must show cause and prejudice 
to excuse a state court procedural default); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 46S (1976) (eliminating 
fourth-amendment claims by state prisoners from habeas review); Teague v. Lane, 109 
S. Ct. 1060 (1989) (no new constitutional rules of criminal procedure will be announced 
on habeas review unless those rules will be applied retroactively to all defendants similarly 
situated). 
307. 110 S. Ct. 1212 (1990). 
308. I d. at 1216 (emphasis added) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh, 109 S. Ct. 2934, 
2944 (1989} (citation omitted)}. 
309. Teague v. Lane, 109 S. Ct. 1060, 1063.64 (1990). The likelihoOd that the 
current United States Supreme Court would find a .. new rule" that meets either exception 
is similar to the likelihood that a resurrected Casanova would find something new about 
sex. 
• 
• 
• 
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In Butler,_ the Supreme Court addressed the question of whether a 
rule is new or dictated by existing precedent. The petitioner in Butler 
' 
had been arrested on an assault and battery charge. He invoked his 
constitutional right. to counsel and retained a lawyer. Thereafter, the 
police informed him that he was a suspect in an unrelated murder case. 
Butler was again given Miranda warnings; he waived his rights and made 
a statement. The statement was utilized, over Butler's objection, in the 
state court homicide trial in which he was convicted. 
Butler sought federal habeas relief on the ground that the police 
should not have initiated questioning on the unrelated murder knowing 
that he had invoked his right to counsel on the assault and battery case. 
Butler argued that Edwards v. Arizona310 required the police to refrain 
from initiating any questioning once the accused invokes his right to 
counsel on any ciffense.311 Butler relied on United States ex rei Espinoza 
v. Fairman312 which interpreted Edwards to support Butler's claim.313 
. . 
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected his argument, 
finding that Edwards did not preclude questioning on an entirely different 
charge .. 314 The Fourth Circuit found that the contrary holding at the 
Seventh Circuit's decision in Espinoza was an unpersuasive and dramatic 
extension of Edwards.3" 
On the same day that the Fourth Circuit denied rehearing, the 
Supreme Court decided Arizona v .. Ri!berson.316 The Court in Roberson 
held that the fifth amendment bars-police-initiated interrogation following 
an accused's request for counsel in a separate investigation.317 
Butler sought, and the Supreme Court granted, certiorari.318 The 
Supreme Court found that Butler could not rely on Roberson because 
Roberson announced a new rule.319 Butler pointed out that the majority 
in Roberson had said the case was_ directly ·controlled by Edwards and 
that, in Roberson, Arizona had specifically asked the Court to create 
an exception to Edwards. 320 Notwithstanding, the majority in Butler 
found that a new rule is announced even if a prior decision controls 
the result, but that result is ''susceptible to debate among reasonable 
minds. " 321 
310. 
311. 
312. 
313. 
314. 
315. 
316. 
317. 
318. 
319. 
320. 
32L 
451 u.s. 477 (1981). 
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1214. 
813 F.2d 117 (7th Cir. 1987). 
Butler. 110 S. Ct. at 1215. 
Butler v. Aiken, 846 F.2d 2SS (4th Cir. 1988). 
Id. at 258. 
486 u.s. 675 (1988). 
Id. at 687 ... 88. 
109 S. Ct. 19S2 (1989). 
Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1218. 
/d. 
Id. at 1217. 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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As the dissent noted, Butler apparently held that a ruling sought 
by a habeas petitioner will be deemed ''new'' unless the challenged 
procedure ''was so clearly invalid under the then prevailing legal standards 
that the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist.''322 
As indicated, new rules will neither be applied nor announced on habeas 
unless the petitioner falls into one of two previously stated exceptions.323 
Given Butler's broad definition of "new rule" and the rigor of the two 
exceptions to the ''new rule'' doctrine, one can conclude that the review 
available to state prisoners on federal habeas has been substantially 
diminished. 
K. Death Penalty 
The most significant death penalty case for Indiana practitioners is 
Daniels v. State.324 This case is significant because the Indiana Supreme 
Court has chosen to adopt the federal habeas ''new rule'' doctrine and 
apply the same to Indiana postconviction proceedings.325 In Daniels, the 
defendant was convicted of felony murder, among other charges, and 
sentenced to death. At the penalty phase, the prosecutor made statements 
concerning personal characteristics of the victim. The statements probably 
offended the rulings in Booth v. MarylanrP26 and South Carolina v. 
Gathers321 because descriptions of the victim's personal characteristics 
and descriptions of the emotional impact of the crime on the victim's 
family, both of which involve factors not known to the defendant at 
the time of the offense, are unrelated to the blameworthiness of the 
defendant and, therefore, are inconsistent with the reasoned decision-
making required in capital cases. 328 
Daniels presented the Booth claim in post-conviction proceedings. 
The Indiana Supreme Court rejected the claim on the merits.329 The 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and remanded the ca~~ 
for reconsideration in light of Gathers.330 
On remand, the Indiana Supreme Court abandoned its established 
rule on retroactivity, 331 noting that its prior position had been influenced 
322. ld. at 1219 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
323. ld. at 1218. 
324. 561 N.E.2d 487 (Ind. 1990). 
325. ld. at 489. 
326. 482 u.s. 496 (1987). 
327. 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989). 
328. See South Carolina v. Gathers, 109 S. Ct. 2207 (1989); Booth v. Maryland, 
482 u.s. 496 (1987). 
329. Daniels v. State, S28 N.E.2d 775 (Ind. 1988). 
330. See Gathers, 109 S. Ct. at 2207. 
331. See Rowley v. State, 483 N.E.2d 1078, 1082 (Ind. 1985) (a new rule should 
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by then-existing federal case law. 332 The court found that federal revisions, 
as set forth in Teague v. Lane333 and Penry v. Lynaugh,334 suggested 
that an analogous revision was appropriate for Indiana. 335 Thus, the 
court adopted the principle that new rules will not be applied in Indiana 
collateral proceedings unless the rule falls within one of two exceptions: 
(1) The rule places certain kinds of conduct beyond the power of the 
criminal law-making authority to proscribe; and (2) the rule requires the 
observance of procedures implicit in the concept of ordered liberty and 
without which the likelihood of ·an accurate conviction is seriously di-
minished.336 The court, while noting that the State was not asserting 
waiver, concluded that Bo.oth and Gathers announced a new rule, and 
that rule did not qualify under either exception. 337 
Clearly, the ·majority decision in Daniels ·narrows the scope of avail-
able review in postconviction proceedings. This restriction is damaging, 
particularly to death penalty litigants; because of the dynamic nature 
of death penalty law.338 The narrowing scope of state and federal review 
can be seen as part of the ongoing effort to accord greater finality to 
criminal judgments. Finality may have virtue, but the vice of finality 
is uncorrected error. 
• 
be applied retroactively and, thus, be available in postconviction proceedings if the rule 
is directly designed to enhance the reliability of criminal trials rather than being only 
tangentially related tO truth finding). 
332. Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 488-89. 
333. 489 u.s. 288 (1989).; 
334. 109 S. Ct. 2934 (1989). 
335. Daniels, 561 N.E.2d at 489. 
336. /d. The court noted that the second exception has been defined, in federal 
cases, as requiring a new rule that "must not only improve accuracy, but also alter our 
understanding_ of the bedrock procedural elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding.'' 
/d. (quoting Sawyer v. Smith, 110 S. Ct. 2822, 2831 (1990)). The court a,Jso pointed out 
that the exceptions may prove inadequate and other particularized exceptions may be 
required. /d. at 490 n.3. 
337. Id. at 490·91. Justice DeBruler dissented and observed that the court had 
0 • 
previously addressed the merits of the Booth claim in Daniels's direct appeal from denial 
of postconviction relief. /d. at 492 (DeBruler, J., dissenting). See Daniels v. State, S28 
N.E.2d 775 (1988). Given this fact and that the remand order called for the court to 
address the same issue again in light of Gathers,_ the dissent co;tcluded that the threshold 
question of whether to address the merits was not before the court. Daniels, 561 N.E.2d 
at 492 (DeBrueler, J., dissenting). 
338. Recall that under the federal definition. a rule is a "new rule" unless the 
challenged procedure ''was so clearly invalid under then prevailing_ legal standards that 
the decision could not be defended by any reasonable jurist." Butler, 110 S. Ct. at 1219 
(Brennan, J ., dissenting). Thus, a slight variation in the application of a principle may 
trigger the ''new rule'' doctrine. Dynamic :areas of the law inevitably involve many such 
slight variations. 
. .... 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
The United States Supreme Court and the Indiana courts continue 
to allocate a large portion of their respective dockets to criminal cases. 
Working through the implicit tension between our interest in crime 
enforcement and our interest in procedural fairness is a never-ending 
process. 
